Determinants of firms’ investment behaviour: a multilevel approach

This article investigates the determinants of firms’ investment behaviour using firm data from 101 developing and emerging economies. A substantial number of firms does not invest in fixed capital or invests little relative to sales revenue. Using a multilevel probit model we study what factors trigger investment, and using a multilevel Heckman selection model we study what factors influence a firm’s investment-to-sales ratio. We find that firms’ investment behaviour has relatively little dependency on a country’s macroeconomic setting. Additionally, we find that, on average, firms that are completely foreign-owned have a relatively lower investment-to-sales ratio. Finally, we find evidence which suggests that the probability of investing is higher for firms located in countries with more control of corruption and we find some evidence which suggests that partially foreign-owned firms located in countries with relatively less corruption have a relatively higher investment-to-sales ratio.     

Political Economy of Systemic and Micro-Corruption Throughout the World

The purpose of this paper is to apply some of the core general principles of heterodox political economy — especially with an institutional and evolutionary emphasis — to the topic of corruption as a global, regional, and national phenomenon. I start with the principle of historical specificity, where the known history of corruption processes and concepts are examined. I follow the evolution of the corruption discourse, starting with the classical scholars of ancient Greece and numerous others, who had a systemic view of the matter. I proceed through the micro-views of Roman law, to Adam Smith and others who took an individualist view of corruption, and onto the reemergence of the corruption discourse in the period between the 1970s and the 2010s. In the process, I investigate the micro-perspective, but increasingly center on the "modern classical works" on systemic corruption. Then, I present the basics of a modern institutional and evolutionary perspective on corruption through the principle of contradiction, which defines corruption as the promotion of vested interests against the common good in the form of bribery, fraud, embezzlement, state capture, nepotism, extortion, and others. Social dominance theory is applied to corruption vis-à-vis dominant and subordinate groups, and the styles of corruption activated by elites are surveyed as they gain resources, favors, and economic surplus against the interests of "common people." Finally, I scrutinize the principle of uneven development, paying special attention to four main stylized facts about corruption throughout the world in relation to (i) development patterns, (ii) corporate corruption, (iii) key sectors/nations, and (iv) inequality. Throughout the paper, I outline ways to reduce corruption and modify the structure of power to benefit the common good, socioeconomic performance, and the functioning of institutions.     

Anti‐corruption agencies: Rhetoric Versus reality

The anti‐corruption successes of Singapore and Hong Kong have encouraged the establishment of strong, centralized anti‐corruption agencies across the globe. This study charts the emergence of anti‐corruption agencies (ACAs), and then examines recent experiences with these bodies in developing countries. We propose a set of criteria for assessing and explaining their performance. The analysis applies within strict limits to those countries that have established the minimum political, legal, and socio‐economic conditions for effective governance. Where these conditions are in place, success is possible. However, ACAs in poor and badly governed states are generally ineffective, if not actively harmful.     

Military expenditure,threats, and growth

In this study we test whether catching up, the hypothesis that there is technological spillover from leaders to followers, is still important among industrialized countries. Since the USA is no longer the technological leader in many industries and since catching up, if it still exists, may not operate uniformly across different industries, a disaggregated study is more appropriate. A testable model is developed and a number of tests for the existence of catching up are performed. A major improvement on previous tests is that the level of technology is measured in terms of total factor productivity. The two major conclusions, which are quite robust, are that after 1970 there is no catching-up effect left in the tradables sector, while catching up is found for industries in the nontradables sector.     

A longitudinal meta-analysis of corruption in international business and trade: Bridging the isolated themes

ABSTRACT

This article chronicles the academic debate on corruption in international business and trade. It identifies three themes: contributing factors, consequences, and combating corruption. We found convergence in the literature and that authors tend to remain loyal to their chosen theme. As a result, we found a distressing dearth of research that transcends, integrates, or validates the interrelationships between them. Through our work, we propose the bridging of themes, demonstrating how they interrelate, thereby validating their interdependencies and the broader lens needed through which to observe corruption in international business.     

Edvard Jäderin

Abstract

Im Jahre 1928 hat Frau Dr. H. Pollaczek-Geiringer ² H. Pollaczek-Geiringer: Die Charliersche Entwicklung willkür licher Funktionen, Skandinavisk Aktuarietidskrift 1928, p. 98–111. in dieser Zeitschrift einen Konvergenzbeweis für die Charlier'sche B-Reihe unter der folgenden Voraussetzung bewiesen:     

Mentoring as a mechanism for improvement in local government

This article reports on a scheme to secure improvement in local government using a peer mentoring network. Mentoring promoted learning, and hence improvement, in many of the participating authorities. Mentoring schemes must be carefully designed to achieve positive outcomes—it is essential to have a clear understanding of what mentoring is and how it should be administered, and to involve members and relevant partners of the mentored organization.     

The decreasing value of non‐SOEs’ political connections during China’s anti‐corruption campaign: evidence and mechanism

In this paper, we find that China’s anti‐corruption campaign since 2012 significantly reduces the value of political connections for non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). We provide evidence showing that the decline of the value of political connections for non‐SOEs is attributed mainly to the decreasing return from political connections, instead of increasing political risk. We further find that the decreasing return of the politically connected firms is driven mainly by the disappearance of the ‘resource effect’ of political connection in facilitating access to bank credit and government subsidies, but not due to the increasing cost of maintaining political connections.     

经济责任审计治理权力“期权化”研究

在以公共选择理论和博弈论作为权力“期权化”的理论基础上,分析了权力“期权化”腐败查处率对社会公众的信号效应,指出公共权力是经济责任审计与权力“期权化”的契合点,进而提出通过由“事”到“人”、由“物”到“人”、由“人”到“事”的途径对党政领导干部进行在任、离任、任后经济责任审计,并公告经济责任审计结果,以压缩权力“期权化”空间,使领导干部不愿、不敢和不能权力“期权化”,从而规范党政领导干部的从政行为,发挥国家审计在经济社会健康运行的免疫系统功能。     

Corruption Distance and Foreign Direct Investment

We study the effects of “corruption distance,” defined as the difference in corruption levels between country pairs on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a “gravity” model and the Heckman (1979) two-stage framework on a data set of forty-five countries from 1997 to 2007, we find that corruption distance adversely influences both the likelihood of FDI and the volume of FDI. A novel finding in this study is that we identify the asymmetric effect of corruption distance and find that the positive corruption distance, defined as the corruption distance from a high corruption source to a low corruption host country, is the prominent one that affects the behavior of bilateral FDI.